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OUR TORT SYSTEM AND AVIATION SAFETY
By LEE S. KREINDLERI
I. INTRODUCTION
A S A PLAINTIFFS' LAWYER, my role is very simple, and very clear,
and brief. We have heard a lot in the last few interesting days
about the aviation safety system, and we have heard a lot about the legal
system. I would like to delineate the places where the aviation safety sys-
tem and the legal system meet and the responsibilities that each serves.
First, I would be remiss if I did not extend my thanks to Southern Meth-
odist University and the Journal of Air Law and Commerce for providing
this forum. I think it is certainly true that through communication, good
must evolve.
In a sense this is the second forum that we have had, but in another sense
it is really the third on related subjects. We started about four years ago
at the University of Southern California and at that time, not unlike this
time, I felt somewhat in the minority. But I learned just yesterday that as
a result of that symposium, at which time a great many things were said
by aviation people and a few things by myself, material changes have been
made in one of the areas which we discussed several years ago. For example,
the military attitude toward privileges and immunities with respect to the
circulation of aviation information has changed. For those of you who do
not know it, the military, which has been the primary advocate of the
"privileged" withholding of accident investigation information, has sub-
stantially retrenched. That makes me feel quite good. It makes me feel that
communication-whatever the forum, whatever the opportunity, whatever
the odds-will lead to better law, better aviation safety and certainly
greater understanding among all of us who participate in this one industry.
I would like to say at the outset, that I do not feel an adverse relationship
with the airlines, nor do I feel an adverse relationship with the manufac-
turers or with the air traffic control facility people. It goes without saying
that I have the greatest affection for John Stephen, George Whitehead and
Harold Caplan, and all of my truly good friends on the other side of the
table in lawsuits and at this symposium. But more important, I do not feel
that my position, as a plaintiffs' lawyer in lawsuits, is an adverse function,
although I can certainly understand how such a distinguished participant in
this seminar as Mike Bates from McDonnell Douglas, who has been sub-
jected to the deposition process, might feel differently.
But I feel-and I mean that I feel-that I am a participant in the indus-
try just as much as the man that designs the airplane. That is not to say,
and I have not said, that I can design an airplane or a component as well as,
or better than, any one of the distinguished companies that is represented
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here today. It is to say that we all ought to recognize that we live in a
community; we live in a society that has many parts, has many facets, and
many functions. It is important for us to recognize that there is no black
and there is no white, that each of us participates in the overall commun-
ity responsibility in a different way. And just as much as I respect what
all of you do, I hope that you will respect the importance of the role that I
serve and other plaintiffs' lawyers serve in the overall scheme of things.
What is the role that I serve? We do not say, and I have not said-and
this has been something of a distortion at this meeting-that we make, in
the handling of a particular case, a contribution to aviation safety. The
particular case, of course, involves an accident that has happened, and
nothing is going to undo that accident. I am not saying that the financial
effect, the economic consequences of the accident in this insurance-minded
age, does not have a direct relationship to aviation safety. Although it may
be a factor in safety, I think that paying the cost of an accident, generally
speaking, does exercise a deterrent effect. But I freely admit and have al-
ways said, that in aviation, as large as it is, with the generalized system of
insurance that it has, the imposition of damages in a particular case does
not exercise a substantial deterrent effect. What I have said, and what I do
say today, is that the existence of the tort system, the fact that individuals,
companies, and even governments are going to be held responsible for their
fault and their negligence and will have to answer in sometimes very per-
sonal ways, has contributed and does contribute to aviation safety. To
make the point as simple and clear as I can, I would shudder to think of
what the conditions would be without that system.
With respect to the attitudes of the various organizations that appear as
defendants in these cases, I think it is very interesting to note that today
we heard from representatives of airlines, manufacturers, and the govern-
ment. We saw what to me was a living example of the system at work. We
saw something happening here today to indicate an attitude that needs
correction and that indeed has been corrected within the last year. If ever
there was an illustration of living law or the need for the legal system, I
think we saw it in operation today. What I have in mind is Chuck Peters'
fine statement of liability on the part of the government, and more par-
ticularly, liability on the part of the Air Traffic Control services. Mr.
Peters said that controllers were taught that there were manuals, and they
were taught regulations, and they thought they derived some support or
some sustenance from the language of regulation "63B," or whatever it
was.
First let me say in defense of our general law system, that -it is a very
big system, and there are a great many people in it. Most of the cases are
right, but some of them are wrong. I think you must realize that when Mr.
Peters talks about an accident, or a court decision, whether it be the Logan
Airport bird ingestion finding against the government or the finding of
lack of contributory negligence on the part of the Mohawk crew up in
Rochester, not all of us think that those decisions were correct. I think
that you should also know that they are being appealed and may be changed
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in higher courts. The appellate procedure exists to correct mistakes. I think
the two illustrations of bad operation of law in this field are nothing more
than examples of mistakes that will be corrected.
Exercising what I thought was a reasonable role in the Mohawk accident,
for example, I did not sue the government because I did not think, per-
sonally, that the government was liable. Others did, for obvious reasons.
Obviously the crew of the airplane has a different interest from that of the
passengers. Their only recourse was against the government. But just bear
in mind that you cannot absorb in the space of a day, or two days, an ac-
curate glimpse of the overall operation of the system. I think the system
operates very well indeed across its length and breadth.
II. LITIGATION BREEDS RESPONSIBILITY-AWARENESS
How does the overall tort system work to promote safety? The attitude
of the government, the Air Traffic Control service, and the lawyers that
have represented them, has been an unrealistic attitude over the last few
years. Compare it with the attitude of the airlines or the manufacturers. It
is true that perhaps 20 or 30 years ago, airline attitudes in negligence cases
were quite different. The airlines now recognize within the functioning of
our tort system, that the fact that a particular pilot on a particular occa-
sion was negligent does not mean that the airline is sick or that the industry
is sick. The airlines have come to recognize that the fact that a mechanic
did his work improperly in a particular case does not mean that the airline
was bad. There is a reasonableness that has attached itself to the airline
attitude over the years that is reflected in court and is reflected in the man-
ner in which the airlines have defended themselves in these negligence suits.
Turning to the manufacturers for a moment, that is not as true of the
manufacturers, as it is of the airlines, simply because we have not been
suing the manufacturers for so long. However, there is a growing sophisti-
cation on the part of manufacturers who have now been exposed to the
litigation process and who have attacked the problem realistically by rec-
ognizing their responsibilities within the functioning of the overall system.
It has been my personal experience, and I speak only for myself, that the
same has not been true within the area of air traffic control. It is not true
that merely because a pilot followed the language, the letter, the comma,
and the word of a regulation, that he did everything that he should have
done under the circumstances. Regulations are only words; negligence oc-
curs only in dynamic situations where the facts and the circumstances dic-
tate the need to do something. In the case of Air Traffic Control and the
operation of FAA facilities, the attitude has been unrealistic. As reflected
by Chuck Peters today, "We have a book of regulations and a manual, and
it does not say in here that the controller should not have left his desk
under these circumstances." Much of the unrealism reached the surface in
the mid-air collision over Brooklyn and Staten Island, where the govern-
ment was sued, and the Air Traffic Control service had to answer for its
conduct. We went on and on, taking 16,000 pages of testimony. Bear that
in mind, incidentally, when you assess the role of the legal system in put-
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ting its finger on fault. Notwithstanding the finding by the Civil Aeronau-
tics Board, which essentially exonerated the FAA air traffic control facilities
from responsibility, the lawsuit proved that the people in Air Traffic Con-
trol had not done what reasonable people would have done under those
circumstances. The government contributed substantially to the settle-
ments of those cases.
Another example is the Ingham case that Chuck Peters mentioned-the
weather reporting case that was decided last year. Sure, a few years ago,
when aviation was much simpler and responsibilities much clearer and we
did not have so many airplanes in the sky or so many passengers to be con-
cerned about, the pilot was the pilot in command and the responsibility of
properly operating the airplane was entirely on him. But is this realistic
from the standpoint of the airline? Is it realistic to expect "reasonableness"
of the airline? Is it realistic to expect "reasonableness" on the part of an
airline, but a mere "going by the book" on the part of Air Traffic Control?
And what has happened? The legal system, which has been criticized
here as contributing nothing to air safety, has told the ATC that this de-
fense is no better for them than it is for airlines. It has been held that the
man in the control tower with the opportunity to prevent an accident has
just as much responsibility to be reasonable and do the right thing under
the circumstances as the man flying the airplane. This change in attitude
was not made by the FAA. In this case the FAA was the facility itself. It
was not made by the CAB which investigated that accident. It was ac-
complished in the civil litigation; this will make the operation of the Air
Traffic Control facilities a safer operation. And so I think we have seen
reflected today something that we live with in litigation: the fact that it
takes time to respond; the fact that the FAA system or the NTSB system
is not the whole answer; the fact that throughout our whole community,
each of us must answer to the community itself. The tort system that I
serve and that my friends of the defense bar serve is the community in
operation.
III. FEAR OF LITIGATION AND WITHHELD INFORMATION
What about the two issues that have been posed at this meeting? What
about setting up a system of privileges or immunities? I have heard it said
here by a reasonable person for whom I have the greatest respect, that in-
formation is not given after aircraft accidents because of the fear of civil
litigation. That is unadulterated nonsense. Consider the third crash of an
F-11 over Viet Nam. Is there anybody in the room who really believes
that civil litigation is on the minds of the General Dynamics Company, or
anybody else? The consequences of that crash are so enormous in so many
other directions that civil litigation is not even a practical consideration.
The reputation of the company and the future of the aircraft, for example,
are far more significant.
It has been my privilege to take the testimony of manufacturers' repre-
sentatives and of airline representatives. I have been doing this in case after
case for the last 19 years. There is not one man among those I examined
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about whom I would say that he withheld information from his employer
or from an investigating agency out of fear of civil litigation. I have too
much respect for the people that I have examined. Look around you in
this room at the representatives of our distinguished manuafcturers. Is
there any man in this room who would withhold information on aviation
safety because of fear of a lawsuit? As I stated, it is absolute nonsense; it
does not happen. It is true that in society there are good people and there
are occasionally not such good people. It is true that people are afraid. It is
true that there are people who make mistakes and do not have the moral
fiber or the courage to admit their mistakes. However, in the dynamic cir-
cumstances that follow a horrible aviation accident the personal factors
are going to be far more important, e.g., living with oneself, looking at
oneself in the mirror, facing one's friends, and facing one's superiors. Few
men would withhold information knowing that another accident of the
same kind might result. If there is such a withholding, it is due to factors
other than litigation.
I think that we have problems in information circulation. A much more
serious problem is one that I have in my own office. We have accumulated
information on one Boeing 707 case that would be usable in another 707
case, or a DC-8 case, if we could only recall it and correlate it.
We have the same problem magnificently illustrated by Bill Russler and
Colonel Keel. We have the problem of finding and using the information
we already have. Remember the photographs of file upon file of informa-
tion, and the computer designed to make use of and correlate what is al-
ready known? This is where the attention should be directed.
Why do people associated with the airline or the insurance side of the
question occasionally say that in the interest of air safety we must elim-
inate the tort system on the grounds that it is restricting the flow of infor-
mation? I know these people are sincere, but I suggest to you that they are
really motivated by the belief that tort litigation is a nuisance. And, they
do not like it, and they would like to be relieved of it, because it is a pain
in the neck. For example, a fine engineer who has worked on an important
project that is on schedule may suddenly be compelled to appear in the
courtroom for a week. Or suddenly his deposition is going to be taken for
three months. It is a terrible inconvenience to the airline and to the manu-
facturer. Of course, they would like to get rid of that problem. That is
more important to them than paying out the damages, incidentally, because
it really interferes with the productive work that they are in business for.
They do not like it. But it is not sufficient to say it is a nuisance. A better
excuse must be found to eliminate the system of civil tort litigation. And
so, we have this concentration on the circulation of information.
I suggest to you, gentlemen, that you cannot get wider dissemination or
circulation of information by restricting information to start with. And,
I also suggest to you that with respect to the privilege and the immunity
concepts they do not make sense logically. As soon as you place artificial
barriers and limitations on the circulation of information you have hurt
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yourself. You are going to get into perfectly incredible, unworkable, and
unrealistic areas.
For example, in an accident that happened within the last few years, a
pilot with a long-standing heart condition died of a heart attack. The at-
tack was found to be the cause of the accident. Suppose that the man had
the heart attack but did not die in the accident. Further suppose he was
granted a privilege so that when he came forward and admitted the back-
ground an immunity as to the information that he came forward with was
available. Is it seriously to be suggested that the man would be permitted
to go on flying aircraft and flying people because he was given an immun-
ity to get the information in the first place? It is ridiculous! The factors
that work upon individuals are far more personal, far more direct, than the
myth of a concern about the ultimate civil litigation.
IV. THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE TORT SYSTEM AND AIR SAFETY
The tort system does not exist for the purpose of aviation safety. That is
obvious. The system exists to provide reasonable compensation to the vic-
tims of accidents. When the argument that the tort system detracts from
aviation safety is started by the people who would like to change the sys-
tem, and when we respond to that argument in the negative, then the issue
is drawn, and we must talk about it. The systems are independent; they
serve different purposes. One really has nothing to do with the other. The
tort system will compensate you if you are injured in an accident, or your
family if you are killed in an accident. This is a very important part of our
community life.
V. THE INTERRELATION OF THE TORT SYSTEM AND AIR SAFETY
How does the tort system contribute to aviation safety? The tort system
is an umbrella over everyone. Reduced to its essentials, it provides that in-
dividuals or corporations shall be held responsible for the damages that they
inflict through their fault. This applies to lawyers; it applies to automobile
drivers; it applies to doctors. It also applies to aviation companies and to
air traffic control facilities. Everybody is answerable to the community
for the damages inflicted by his fault. The community acts through the
jury which is so often criticized. The jury is in theory and in practice the
representative of the community. Juries occasionally make mistakes. How-
ever, across the board, in case after case, they perform quite well. The
jury is a group of selected members of the community who may have to de-
termine, as Colonel Keel pointed out, how much money should be spent to
save five lives. That decision is not one for a manufacturer. It is not a deci-
sion for the manufacturer to make in a vacuum, unanswerable to anyone.
The manufacturer should make the decision of reasonableness, or negligence
which is the lack of reasonableness, knowing that someday a jury may pass
on the question. That someday hardly ever happens. That manufacturer
hardly ever makes a significant mistake that causes a major accident. But
it is the existence of the system-the fact that the manufacturer will have
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to answer or the airline will have to answer or the air traffic control sys-
tem will have to answer, if there is a serious accident-that exercises a bene-
ficial effect on the entire aviation safety picture.
VI. THE IMPACT OF THE TORT SYSTEM ON INDIVIDUALS
As I said before, the financial responsibility resulting from fault in avi-
ation accidents does not have a significant effect. But there is a factor that
is significant. Taking depositions of particular people reveal that litigation
has a significant impact on these individuals. The question has come up in a
slightly different form. Last year, Harold Caplan said he had heard of a
man who was deposed because he "went through the wringer," so to speak,
in civil litigation. He was so upset that he had a nervous breakdown. In
this writer's experience nothing like that has ever happened. In my expe-
rience, lawyers have conducted themselves very well, and if they were bad
lawyers or they did improper things they did not last in the league that
handles the significant cases. They just disappeared. The only lawyers that
the distinguished insurance people in this audience know are lawyers who
would never be involved in a self-defacing process that reduces people to
nervous breakdowns.
But, what does the process do? Litigation has produced for individuals,
for the first time, a feeling of personal responsibility. The NTSB investiga-
tion or public hearings cannot, in 3 days or 5 days of hearings in which
an individual testifies for an hour and a half, or at the most 3 hours, con-
duct a careful exploration with the documents on the table, or with the
opportunity to get more documents on the table.
When George Whitehead said, earlier today, that the manufacturer
knows the cause of the accident right after it happened and that five years
after, when the litigation came up, there was nothing to be gained from the
process, he was incorrect. There is indeed something to be gained from the
process. Recently, after a major jet transport accident which caused con-
cern along the length and the breadth of the entire industry because it was
an early accident in the experience of this major aircraft, everyone got ter-
ribly upset. There was a meeting convened by the manufacturer about five
weeks after the accident. The FAA and the CAB were there as well as rep-
resentatives of every airline around the world that was using that aircraft.
Those people were subjected to a program not really too unlike what we
have had here for the last two days. There were slides, descriptions, data,
graphs, and explanations. The manufacturer said: "We are certainly very
concerned about this accident, but we assure you that in this area, this
area and this area, the aircraft is perfectly safe and no changes need be
made." Almost everything of significance that was produced for the bene-
fit of the FAA, the CAB, and the airline users at that meeting was false.
It was false, and I would say fraudulent! There was no time in any public
investigation for a meticulous examination of the facts with the docu-
ments on the table.
But what happened in the litigation? For three or four months the chief
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engineer in the appropriate area sat in my office with the documents on the
table. For the first time someone asked him about his statements at the
post-accident meeting. This was but one of the many areas that was cov-
ered. The confrontation went something like this:
Question: You spoke at that meeting on such and such a date, and you
described this slide. Were your conclusions based on engineering analysis
or studies, or was that based on flight test data?
Answer: It was based on both.
Question: All right, you have been ordered to produce the engineering
studies. Here they are. Where is the support material?
Answer: It's not there.
Question: Where is it?
Answer: It must be back at the factory.
The deposition was adjourned for a week so that the engineer could go
back to the factory. Then the man came back and said: "I am in the aero-
dynamics department. And I am afraid I should not have said what I said
because this is an area outside my competence. You had better ask some-
body in the flight test department. It must have been flight test data. Those
are files I have not been able to get a hold of." Again the deposition was ad-
journed for another week while the flight test engineer was deposed. The
alleged flight test data was never produced.
The depositions in this civil litigation established for the first time that
the material given to the FAA, to the CAB representatives, and to the air-
lines who were using this major aircraft was invented out of rarified air. It
was false, and it was fraudulent; a careful study of the engineering data
and the flight test material that was on hand demonstrated just the opposite
of what those attending the post-accident meeting had been told. The fact
of the matter was, of course, that about two years after the accident neces-
sary changes were made in the aircraft. But, for those of you who are so
naive as to think that the FAA is going to catch everything and the NTSB,
with the great job that it does in a short period of time, is going to catch
everything and that we can go on in sublime comfort to know that our
lives are not in jeopardy, I want to tell you that that litigation produced
plenty. And what was the most important thing that it produced? It pro-
duced for the first time on the part of the engineers who had to testify in
that case the knowledge and the understanding that if they ever made mis-
takes again they might be back at that or a similar table to answer similar
questions.
Although perhaps only 4 or 5 people were involved in that investigation
in that one piece of litigation, that company is a better company because
of the experience each of those individuals who went through the litiga-
tion process received. And, this knowledge will continue to be made known
to each of their colleagues. The experience of each individual is important
because a man who plays a significant role in the design of one airplane will
play a significant role in the design of another airplane that is made by his
company. The experience is a therapeutic experience. It is part of a learn-
ing process.
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This has happened with respect to airlines and with respect to manu-
facturers. It has happened with respect to air traffic control facilities. The
people involved and their colleagues will not make the same kind of mis-
takes in the future. They are different people, and they are better people.
VII. CONCLUSION
In summary, I would not say that our tort system exists to make aviation
safer, but I would say that this is one of its consequences.
